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One of the reasons why most of us feel puzzled about the 
problem of abortion is that we want, and do not want, to 
allow to the unborn child the rights that belong to adults 
and children. When we think of a baby about to be born it 
seems absurd to think that the next few minutes or even 
hours could make so radical a difference to its status; yet 
as we go back in the life of the fetus we are more and 
more reluctant to say that this is a human being and must 
be treated as such. No doubt this is the deepest source of 
our dilemma, but it is not the only one. For we are also 
confused about the general question of what we may and 
may not do where the interests of human beings conflict. 
We have strong intuitions about certain cases; saying, for 
instance, that it is all right to raise the level of education 
in our country, though statistics allow us to predict that a 
rise in the suicide rate will follow, while it is not all right 
to kill the feeble-minded to aid cancer research. It is not 
easy, however, to see the principles involved, and one 
way of throwing light on the abortion issue will be by 
setting up parallels involving adults or children once born. 
So we will be able to isolate the “equal rights” issue and 
should be able to make some advance. 
I shall not, of course, discuss all the principles that may 
be used in deciding how to act where the interests or 
rights of human beings conflict. What I want to do is to 
look at one particular theory, known as the “doctrine of 
the double effect” which is invoked by Catholics in 
support of their views on abortion but supposed by them 
to apply elsewhere. As used in the abortion argument this 
doctrine has often seemed to non-Catholics to be a piece 
of complete sophistry. In the last number of the Oxford 
Review it was given short shrift by Professor Hart.1 And 
yet this principle has seemed to some non-Catholics as 
well as to Catholics to stand as the only defence against 
decisions on other issues that are quite unacceptable. It 
will help us in our difficulty about abortion if this conflict 
can be resolved. 
The doctrine of the double effect is based on a distinction 
between what a man foresees as a result of his voluntary 
action and what, in the strict sense, he intends. He intends 
in the strictest sense both those things that he aims at as 
ends and those that he aims at as means to his ends. The 
latter may be regretted in themselves but nevertheless 
desired for the sake of the end, as we may intend to keep 
dangerous lunatics confined for the sake of our safety. By 
contrast a man is said not strictly, or directly, to intend the 
foreseen consequences of his voluntary actions where 
these are neither the end at which he is aiming nor the 
means to this end. Whether the word “intention” should 
be applied in both cases is not of course what matters: 
Bentham spoke of “oblique intention,” contrasting it with 
the “direct intention” of ends and means, and we may as 
well follow his terminology. Everyone must recognize 
that some such distinction can be made, though it may be 
made in a number of different ways, and it is the 
distinction that is crucial to the doctrine of the double 
effect. The words “double effect” refer to the two effects 
that an action may produce: the one aimed at, and the one 
foreseen but in no way desired. By “the doctrine of the 
double effect” I mean the thesis that it is sometimes 
permissible to bring about by oblique intention what one 
may not directly intend. Thus the distinction is held to be 
relevant to moral decision in certain difficult cases. It is 
said for instance that the operation of hysterectomy 
involves the death of the fetus as the foreseen but not 
strictly or directly intended consequence of the surgeon’s 
act, while other operations kill the child and count as the 
direct intention of taking an innocent life, a distinction 
that has evoked particularly bitter reactions on the part of 
non-Catholics. If you are permitted to bring about the 
death of the child, what does it matter how it is done? The 
doctrine of the double effect is also used to show why in 
another case, where a woman in labor will die unless a 
craniotomy operation is performed, the intervention is not 
to be condoned. There, it is said, we may not operate but 
must let the mother die. We foresee her death but do not 
directly intend it, whereas to crush the skull of the child 
would count as direct intention of its death.2  
This last application of the doctrine has been queried by 
Professor Hart on the ground that the child’s death is not 
strictly a means to saving the mother’s life and should 
logically be treated as an unwanted but foreseen 
consequence by those who make use of the distinction 
between direct and oblique intention. To interpret the 
doctrine in this way is perfectly reasonable given the 
language that has been used; it would, however, make 
nonsense of it from the beginning. A certain event may be 
desired under one of its descriptions, unwanted under 
another, but we cannot treat these as two different events, 
one of which is aimed at and the other not. And even if it 
be argued that there are here two different events—the 
crushing of the child’s skull and its death—the two are 
obviously much too close for an application of the 
doctrine of the double effect. To see how odd it would be 
to apply the principle like this we may consider the story, 
well known to philosophers, of the fat man stuck in the 
mouth of the cave. A party of potholers have imprudently 
allowed the fat man to lead them as they make their way 
out of the cave, and he gets stuck, trapping the others 
behind him. Obviously the right thing to do is to sit down 
and wait until the fat man grows thin; but philosophers 
have arranged that floodwaters should be rising within the 
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cave. Luckily (luckily?) the trapped party have with them 
a stick of dynamite with which they can blast the fat man 
out of the mouth of the cave. Either they use the dynamite 
or they drown. In one version the fat man, whose head is 
in the cave, will drown with them; in the other he will be 
rescued in due course.3 Problem: may they use the 
dynamite or not? Later we shall find parallels to this 
example. Here it is introduced for light relief and because 
it will serve to show how ridiculous one version of the 
doctrine of the double effect would be. For suppose that 
the trapped explorers were to argue that the death of the 
fat man might be taken as a merely foreseen consequence 
of the act of blowing him up. (“We didn’t want to kill him 
… only to blow him into small pieces” or even “… only 
to blast him out of the cave.”) I believe that those who use 
the doctrine of the double effect would rightly reject such 
a suggestion, though they will, of course, have 
considerable difficulty in explaining where the line is to 
be drawn. What is to be the criterion of “closeness” if we 
say that anything very close to what we are literally 
aiming at counts as if part of our aim? 
Let us leave this difficulty aside and return to the 
arguments for and against the doctrine, supposing it to be 
formulated in the way considered most effective by its 
supporters, and ourselves bypassing the trouble by taking 
what must on any reasonable definition be clear cases of 
“direct” or “oblique” intention. 
The first point that should be made clear, in fairness to the 
theory, is that no one is suggesting that it does not matter 
what you bring about as long as you merely foresee and 
do not strictly intend the evil that follows. We might 
think, for instance, of the (actual) case of wicked 
merchants selling, for cooking, oil they knew to be 
poisonous and thereby killing a number of innocent 
people, comparing and contrasting it with that of some 
unemployed gravediggers, desperate for custom, who got 
hold of this same oil and sold it (or perhaps they secretly 
gave it away) in order to create orders for graves. They 
strictly (directly) intend the deaths they cause, while the 
merchants could say that it was not part of their plan that 
anyone should die. In morality, as in law, the merchants, 
like the gravediggers, would be considered as murderers; 
nor are the supporters of the doctrine of the double effect 
bound to say that there is the least difference between 
them in respect of moral turpitude. What they are 
committed to is the thesis that sometimes it makes a 
difference to the permissibility of an action involving 
harm to others that this harm, although foreseen, is not 
part of the agent’s direct intention. An end such as 
earning one’s living is clearly not such as to justify either 
the direct or oblique intention of the death of innocent 
people, but in certain cases one is justified in bringing 
about knowingly what one could not directly intend. 
It is now time to say why this doctrine should be taken 
seriously in spite of the fact that it sounds rather odd, that 
there are difficulties about the distinction on which it 
depends, and that it seemed to yield one sophistical 
conclusion when applied to the problem of abortion. The 
reason for its appeal is that its opponents have often 
seemed to be committed to quite indefensible views. Thus 
the controversy has raged around examples such as the 
following. Suppose that a judge or magistrate is faced 
with rioters demanding that a culprit be found for a 
certain crime and threatening otherwise to take their own 
bloody revenge on a particular section of the community. 
The real culprit being unknown, the judge sees himself as 
able to prevent the bloodshed only by framing some 
innocent person and having him executed. Beside this 
example is placed another in which a pilot whose airplane 
is about to crash is deciding whether to steer from a more 
to a less inhabited area. To make the parallel as close as 
possible it may rather be supposed that he is the driver of 
a runaway tram which he can only steer from one narrow 
track on to another; five men are working on one track 
and one man on the other; anyone on the track he enters is 
bound to be killed. In the case of the riots the mob have 
five hostages, so that in both the exchange is supposed to 
be one man’s life for the lives of five. The question is 
why we should say, without hesitation, that the driver 
should steer for the less occupied track, while most of us 
would be appalled at the idea that the innocent man could 
be framed. It may be suggested that the special feature of 
the latter case is that it involves the corruption of justice, 
and this is, of course, very important indeed. But if we 
remove that special feature, supposing that some private 
individual is to kill an innocent person and pass him off as 
the criminal we still find ourselves horrified by the idea. 
The doctrine of double effect offers us a way out of the 
difficulty, insisting that it is one thing to steer towards 
someone foreseeing that you will kill him and another to 
aim at his death as part of your plan. Moreover there is 
one very important element of good in what is here 
insisted. In real life it would hardly ever be certain that 
the man on the narrow track would be killed. Perhaps he 
might find a foothold on the side of the tunnel and cling 
on as the vehicle hurtled by. The driver of the tram does 
not then leap off and brain him with a crowbar. The 
judge, however, needs the death of the innocent man for 
his (good) purposes. If the victim proves hard to hang he 
must see to it that he dies another way. To choose to 
execute him is to choose that this evil shall come about, 
and this must therefore count as a certainty in weighing 
up the good and evil involved. The distinction between 
direct and oblique intention is crucial here, and is of great 
importance in an uncertain world. Nevertheless this is no 
way to defend the doctrine of double effect. For the 
question is whether the difference between aiming at 
something and obliquely intending it is in itself relevant to 
moral decisions; not whether it is important when 
correlated with a difference of certainty in the balance of 
good and evil. Moreover we are particularly interested in 
the application of the doctrine of the double effect to the 
question of abortion, and no one can deny that in 
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medicine there are sometimes certainties so complete that 
it would be a mere quibble to speak of the “probable 
outcome” of this course of action or that. It is not, 
therefore, with a merely philosophical interest that we 
should put aside the uncertainty and scrutinize the 
examples to test the doctrine of the double effect. Why 
can we not argue from the case of the steering driver to 
that of the judge? 
Another pair of examples poses a similar problem. We are 
about to give a patient who needs it to save his life a 
massive dose of a certain drug in short supply. There 
arrive, however, five other patients each of whom could 
be saved by one-fifth of that dose. We say with regret that 
we cannot spare our whole supply of the drug for a single 
patient, just as we should say that we could not spare the 
whole resources of a ward for one dangerously ill 
individual when ambulances arrive bringing in victims of 
a multiple crash. We feel bound to let one man die rather 
than many if that is our only choice. Why then do we not 
feel justified in killing people in the interests of cancer 
research or to obtain, let us say, spare parts for grafting on 
to those who need them? We can suppose, similarly, that 
several dangerously ill people can be saved only if we kill 
a certain individual and make a serum from his dead 
body. (These examples are not over-fanciful considering 
present controversies about prolonging the life of mortally 
ill patients whose eyes or kidneys are to be used for 
others.) Why cannot we argue from the case of the scarce 
drug to that of the body needed for medical purposes? 
Once again the doctrine of the double effect comes up 
with an explanation. In one kind of case but not the other 
we aim at the death of an innocent man. 
A further argument suggests that if the doctrine of the 
double effect is rejected this has the consequences of 
putting us hopelessly in the power of bad men. Suppose 
for example that some tyrant should threaten to torture 
five men if we ourselves would not torture one. Would it 
be our duty to do so, supposing we believed him, because 
this would be no different from choosing to rescue five 
men from his torturers rather than one? If so, anyone who 
wants us to do something we think wrong has only to 
threaten that otherwise he himself will do something we 
think worse. A mad murderer, known to keep his 
promises, could thus make it our duty to kill some 
innocent citizen to prevent him from killing two. From 
this conclusion we are again rescued by the doctrine of 
the double effect. If we refuse, we foresee that the greater 
number will be killed but we do not intend it: it is he who 
intends (that is strictly or directly intends) the death of 
innocent persons; we do not. 
At one time I thought that these arguments in favor of the 
doctrine of the double effect were conclusive, but I now 
believe that the conflict should be solved in another way. 
The clue that we should follow is that the strength of the 
doctrine seems to lie in the distinction it makes between 
what we do (equated with direct intention) and what we 
allow (thought of as obliquely intended). Indeed it is 
interesting that the disputants tend to argue about whether 
we are to be held responsible for what we allow as we are 
for what we do.4 Yet it is not obvious that this is what 
they should be discussing, since the distinction between 
what one does and what one allows to happen is not the 
same as that between direct and oblique intention. To see 
this one has only to consider that it is possible 
deliberately to allow something to happen, aiming at it 
either for its own sake or as part of one’s plan for 
obtaining something else. So one person might want 
another person dead and deliberately allow him to die. 
And again one may be said to do things that one does not 
aim at, as the steering driver would kill the man on the 
track. Moreover there is a large class of things said to be 
brought about rather than either done or allowed where 
either kind of intention is possible. So it is possible to 
bring about a man’s death by getting him to sea in a leaky 
boat, and the intention of his death may be either direct or 
oblique. 
Whatever it may, or may not, have to do with the doctrine 
of the double effect, the idea of allowing is worth looking 
into in this context. I shall leave aside the special case of 
giving permission, which involves the idea of authority, 
and consider the two main divisions into which cases of 
allowing seem to fall. There is firstly the allowing which 
is forbearing to prevent. For this we need a sequence 
thought of as somehow already in train, and something 
that an agent could do to intervene. (The agent must be 
able to intervene, but does not do so.) So, for instance, he 
could warn someone, but allows him to walk into a trap. 
He could feed an animal but allows it to die for lack of 
food. He could stop a leaking tap but allows the water to 
go on flowing. This is the case of allowing with which we 
shall be concerned, but the other should be mentioned. It 
is the kind of allowing which is roughly equivalent to 
enabling; the root idea being the removal of some 
obstacle which is, as it were, holding back a train of 
events. So someone may remove a plug and allow water 
to flow; open a door and allow an animal to get out; or 
give someone money and allow him to get back on his 
feet. 
The first kind of allowing requires an omission, but there 
is no other general correlation between omission and 
allowing, commission and bringing about or doing. An 
actor who fails to turn up for a performance will generally 
spoil it rather than allow it to be spoiled. I mention the 
distinction between omission and commission only to set 
it aside. 
Thinking of the first kind of allowing (forbearing to 
prevent), we should ask whether there is any difference, 
from the moral point of view, between what one does or 
causes and what one merely allows. It seems clear that on 
occasions one is just as bad as the other, as is recognized 
in both morality and law. A man may murder his child or 
his aged relatives by allowing them to die of starvation as 
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by giving poison; he may also be convicted of murder on 
either account. In another case we would, however, make 
a distinction. Most of us allow people to die of starvation 
in India and Africa, and there is surely something wrong 
with us that we do; it would be nonsense, however, to 
pretend that it is only in law that we make the distinction 
between allowing people in the under-developed countries 
to die of starvation and sending them poisoned food. 
There is worked into our moral system a distinction 
between what we owe people in the form of aid and what 
we owe them in the way of non-interference. Salmond, in 
his Jurisprudence, expressed as follows the distinction 
between the two. 
“A positive right corresponds to a positive duty, and 
is a right that he on whom the duty lies shall do some 
positive act on behalf of the person entitled. A 
negative right corresponds to a negative duty, and is a 
right that the person bound shall refrain from some 
act which would operate to the prejudice of the 
person entitled. The former is a right to be positively 
benefited; the latter is merely a right not to be 
harmed.”5  
As a general account of rights and duties this is defective, 
since not all are so closely connected with benefit and 
harm. Nevertheless for our purposes it will do well. Let us 
speak of negative duties when thinking of the obligation 
to refrain from such things as killing or robbing, and of 
the positive duty, e.g., to look after children or aged 
parents. It will be useful, however, to extend the notion of 
positive duty beyond the range of things that are strictly 
called duties, bringing acts of charity under this heading. 
These are owed only in a rather loose sense, and some 
acts of charity could hardly be said to be owed at all, so I 
am not following ordinary usage at this point. 
Let us now see whether the distinction of negative and 
positive duties explains why we see differently the action 
of the steering driver and that of the judge, of the doctors 
who withhold the scarce drug and those who obtain a 
body for medical purposes, of those who choose to rescue 
five men rather than one man from torture and those who 
are ready to torture the one man themselves in order to 
save five. In each case we have a conflict of duties, but 
what kind of duties are they? Are we, in each case, 
weighing positive duties against positive, negative against 
negative, or one against the other? Is the duty to refrain 
from injury, or rather to bring aid? 
The steering driver faces a conflict of negative duties, 
since it is his duty to avoid injuring five men and also his 
duty to avoid injuring one. In the circumstances he is not 
able to avoid both, and it seems clear that he should do 
the least injury he can. The judge, however, is weighing 
the duty of not inflicting injury against the duty of 
bringing aid. He wants to rescue the innocent people 
threatened with death but can do so only by inflicting 
injury himself. Since one does not in general have the 
same duty to help people as to refrain from injuring them, 
it is not possible to argue to a conclusion about what he 
should do from the steering driver case. It is interesting 
that, even where the strictest duty of positive aid exists, 
this still does not weigh as if a negative duty were 
involved. It is not, for instance, permissible to commit a 
murder to bring one’s starving children food. If the choice 
is between inflicting injury on one or many there seems 
only one rational course of action; if the choice is between 
aid to some at the cost of injury to others, and refusing to 
inflict the injury to bring the aid, the whole matter is open 
to dispute. So it is not inconsistent of us to think that the 
driver must steer for the road on which only one man 
stands while the judge (or his equivalent) may not kill the 
innocent person in order to stop the riots. Let us now 
consider the second pair of examples, which concern the 
scarce drug on the one hand and on the other the body 
needed to save lives. Once again we find a difference 
based on the distinction between the duty to avoid injury 
and the duty to provide aid. Where one man needs a 
massive dose of the drug and we withhold it from him in 
order to save five men, we are weighing aid against aid. 
But if we consider killing a man in order to use his body 
to save others, we are thinking of doing him an injury to 
bring others aid. In an interesting variant of the model, we 
may suppose that instead of killing someone we 
deliberately let him die. (Perhaps he is a beggar to whom 
we are thinking of giving food, but then we say “No, they 
need bodies for medical research.”) Here it does seem 
relevant that in allowing him to die we are aiming at his 
death, but presumably we are inclined to see this as a 
violation of negative rather than positive duty. If this is 
right, we see why we are unable in either case to argue to 
a conclusion from the case of the scarce drug. 
In the examples involving the torturing of one man or five 
men, the principle seems to be the same as for the last 
pair. If we are bringing aid (rescuing people about to be 
tortured by the tyrant), we must obviously rescue the 
larger rather than the smaller group. It does not follow, 
however, that we would be justified in inflicting the 
injury, or getting a third person to do so, in order to save 
the five. We may therefore refuse to be forced into acting 
by the threats of bad men. To refrain from inflicting 
injury ourselves is a stricter duty than to prevent other 
people from inflicting injury, which is not to say that the 
other is not a very strict duty indeed. 
So far the conclusions are the same as those at which we 
might arrive following the doctrine of the double effect, 
but in others they will be different, and the advantage 
seems to be all on the side of the alternative. Suppose, for 
instance, that there are five patients in a hospital whose 
lives could be saved by the manufacture of a certain gas, 
but that this inevitably releases lethal fumes into the room 
of another patient whom for some reason we are unable to 
move. His death, being of no use to us, is clearly a side 
effect, and not directly intended. Why then is the case 
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different from that of the scarce drug, if the point about 
that is that we foresaw but did not strictly intend the death 
of the single patient? Yet it surely is different. The 
relatives of the gassed patient would presumably be 
successful if they sued the hospital and the whole story 
came out. We may find it particularly revolting that 
someone should be used as in the case where he is killed 
or allowed to die in the interest of medical research, and 
the fact of using may even determine what we would 
decide to do in some cases, but the principle seems 
unimportant compared with our reluctance to bring such 
injury for the sake of giving aid. 
My conclusion is that the distinction between direct and 
oblique intention plays only a quite subsidiary role in 
determining what we say in these cases, while the 
distinction between avoiding injury and bringing aid is 
very important indeed. I have not, of course, argued that 
there are no other principles. For instance it clearly makes 
a difference whether our positive duty is a strict duty or 
rather an act of charity: feeding our own children or 
feeding those in faraway countries. It may also make a 
difference whether the person about to suffer is one 
thought of as uninvolved in the threatened disaster, and 
whether it is his presence that constitutes the threat to the 
others. In many cases we find it very hard to know what 
to say, and I have not been arguing for any general 
conclusion such as that we may never, whatever the 
balance of good and evil, bring injury to one for the sake 
of aid to others, even when this injury amounts to death. I 
have only tried to show that even if we reject the doctrine 
of the double effect we are not forced to the conclusion 
that the size of the evil must always be our guide. 
Let us now return to the problem of abortion, carrying out 
our plan of finding parallels involving adults or children 
rather than the unborn. We must say something about the 
different cases in which abortion might be considered on 
medical grounds. 
First of all there is the situation in which nothing that can 
be done will save the life of child and mother, but where 
the life of the mother can be saved by killing the child. 
This is parallel to the case of the fat man in the mouth of 
the cave who is bound to be drowned with the others if 
nothing is done. Given the certainty of the outcome, as it 
was postulated, there is no serious conflict of interests 
here, since the fat man will perish in either case, and it is 
reasonable that the action that will save someone should 
be done. It is a great objection to those who argue that the 
direct intention of the death of an innocent person is never 
justifiable that the edict will apply even in this case. The 
Catholic doctrine on abortion must here conflict with that 
of most reasonable men. Moreover we would be justified 
in performing the operation whatever the method used, 
and it is neither a necessary nor a good justification of the 
special case of hysterectomy that the child’s death is not 
directly intended, being rather a foreseen consequence of 
what is done. What difference could it make as to how the 
death is brought about? 
Secondly we have the case in which it is possible to 
perform an operation which will save the mother and kill 
the child or kill the mother and save the child. This is 
parallel to the famous case of shipwrecked mariners who 
believed that they must throw someone overboard if their 
boat was not to founder in a storm, and to the other 
famous case of the two sailors, Dudley and Stephens, who 
killed and ate the cabin boy when adrift on the sea 
without food. Here again there is no conflict of interests 
so far as the decision to act is concerned; only in deciding 
whom to save. Once again it would be reasonable to act, 
though one would respect someone who held back from 
the appalling action either because he preferred to perish 
rather than do such a thing or because he held on past the 
limits of reasonable hope. In real life the certainties 
postulated by philosophers hardly ever exist, and Dudley 
and Stephens were rescued not long after their ghastly 
meal. Nevertheless if the certainty were absolute, as it 
might be in the abortion case, it would seem better to save 
one than none. Probably we should decide in favor of the 
mother when weighing her life against that of the unborn 
child, but it is interesting that, a few years later, we might 
easily decide it the other way. 
The worst dilemma comes in the third kind of example 
where to save the mother we must kill the child, say by 
crushing its skull, while if nothing is done the mother will 
perish but the child can be safely delivered after her 
death. Here the doctrine of the double effect has been 
invoked to show that we may not intervene, since the 
child’s death would be directly intended while the 
mother’s would not. On a strict parallel with cases not 
involving the unborn we might find the conclusion correct 
though the reason given was wrong. Suppose, for 
instance, that in later life the presence of a child was 
certain to bring death to the mother. We would surely not 
think ourselves justified in ridding her of it by a process 
that involved its death. For in general we do not think that 
we can kill one innocent person to rescue another, quite 
apart from the special care that we feel is due to children 
once they have prudently got themselves born. What we 
would be prepared to do when a great many people were 
involved is another matter, and this is probably the key to 
one quite common view of abortion on the part of those 
who take quite seriously the rights of the unborn child. 
They probably feel that if enough people were involved 
one must be sacrificed, and they think of the mother’s life 
against the unborn child’s life as if it were many against 
one. But of course many people do not view it like this at 
all, having no inclination to accord to the fetus or unborn 
child anything like ordinary human status in the matter of 
rights. I have not been arguing for or against these points 
of view but only trying to discern some of the currents 
that are pulling us back and forth. The levity of the 
examples is not meant to offend. 
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She says: “We are about to give to a patient who needs it 
to save his life, a massive dose of a certain drug in short 
supply. There arrive, however, five other patients each of 
whom could be saved by one fifth of that dose. E say with 
regret that we cannot spare out whole supply of the drug 
for a single patient, just as we should say that we could 
not spare the whole resource of a ward for one 
dangerously ill individual when ambulances arrive 
bringing in victims of a multiple crash. We feel bound to 
let one man die rather than many if that is our only 
choice.” — I feel a curious disagreement about this. There 
seems to me nothing wrong with giving the single patient 
the massive dose and letting the others die, of with 
refusing to deprive the single patient of care necessary to 
keep him alive because the hands needed for that care 
could help in saving the many victims of an accident. The 
latter care is vaguely sketched, and one pictures resources 
being lavishly used beyond necessity on one. But let it be 
made exact; let there be a machine which it takes three 
people to operate—it will not work unless there are three 
on the job; and these three could be summoned away to 
help more than one person. It seems to me justifiable to 
say one can’t spare those three people because of the job 
they are doing, if their work seems roughly as likely to 
save that one person as to save several to whose aid they 
could be called. Not that it seems (absolutely) necessary 
to keep then on the job they are doing; but either course, 
to leave the one to die or to keep them working his 
machine, seems O.K. Yet Mrs. Foot regards it as obvious 
that one must save the greater number. 
Why is this, and how could the disagreement be resolve? 
Suppose I am the doctor, and I don’t use the drug at all. 
Whom do I wrong? None of them can say: “you owed it 
to me.” For there might be nine, and if one can say that, 
all can; but if I sued it, I let one at least go without and he 
can’t say I owed it to him. Yet all can reproach me if I 
gave it to none. It was there, ready to supply human need, 
and human need was not supplied. So any one of them 
can say: you ought to have used it to help us who needed 
it; and so all are wronged. But if it was used for someone, 
as much as he needed it to keep him alive, no one has any 
ground for accusing me of having wronged himself. — 
Why, just because he was one of the five who could have 
been saved, is he wronged in not being saved, if someone 
is supplied with it who needed it? What is his claim, 
except the claim that what was needed go to him rather 
than be wasted? But it was not wasted. So he was not 
wronged. So who was wronged? And if no one was 
wronged, what injury did I do? 
Similarly if there are a lot of people stranded on a rock, 
and one person on another, and someone goes with a boat 
to rescue the single one, what cause, so far, have any of 
the others for complaint? They are not injured unless help 
that was owing to them was withheld. There was the boat 
that could have helped them; but it was not left idle; no, it 
went to save that other one. What is the accusation that 
each of them can make? What wrong can he claim has 
been done him? None whatsoever: unless the preference 
signalized some ignoble contempt. 
I do not mean that “because they are more” isn’t a good 
reason for helping these and not the one, or these rather 
than those. It is a perfectly intelligible reason. But it 
doesn’t follow from that that a man acts badly if he 
doesn’t make it his reason. He acts badly if he chooses to 
rescue rich people rather than poor ones, having ill regard 
for the poor ones because they are poor. But he doesn’t 
act badly if he uses his resources to save X, or X, Y and 
Z, for bad reason, and is not affected by the consideration 
that he could save a larger number of people. For, one 
more: who can say he is wronged? And if no on is 
wronged, how does the rescuer commit any wrong? 
In this connection, the following observation si of some 
importance, as the contrary may be taken for granted by 
some: when I do action A for reasons R, it is not 
necessary or even usual for me to have any special reason 
for doing-action-A-rather-than-action-B, which may also 
be possible. 
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